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NEAL KUMAR KATYAL

Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today's
Most Dangerous Branch from Within
ABSTRACT. The standard conception of separation of powers presumes three branches with
equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers. Today, however, legislative abdication is the
reigning modus operandi. Instead of bemoaning this state of affairs, this Essay asks how
separation of powers can be reflected within the executive branch when that branch, not the
legislature, is making much of the law today. The first-best concept of "legislature v. executive"
checks and balances must be updated to contemplate second-best "executive v. executive"
divisions. A critical mechanism to promote internal separation of powers is bureaucracy. Much
maligned by both the political left and right, bureaucracy serves crucial functions. It creates a
civil service not beholden to any particular administration and a cadre of experts with a longterm institutional worldview. This Essay therefore proposes a set of mechanisms that can create
checks and balances within the executive branch in the foreign affairs area. The apparatuses are
familiar- separate and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review of government action by
different agencies, civil-service protections for agency workers, reporting requirements to
Congress, and an impartial decision-maker to resolve inter-agency conflicts. The idea is to create
a more textured conception of the presidency than either the unitary executivists or their critics
espouse.
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INTRODUCTION

Our political system, and much academic writing about it, is premised on
the idea that "the great security against a gradual concentration of the several
powers in the same department consists in giving to those who administer each
department the necessary constitutional means and personal motives to resist
encroachments of the others .... Ambition must be made to counteract
ambition."1 But what if this idea is now bunk?
After all, Publius's view of separation of powers presumes three branches
with equivalent ambitions of maximizing their powers, yet legislative
abdication is the reigning modus operandi. It is often remarked that "9/11
changed everything"; 2 particularly so in the war on terror, in which Congress
has been absent or content to pass vague, open-ended statutes. The result is an
executive that subsumes much of the tripartite structure of government.
Many commentators have bemoaned this state of affairs. This Essay will
not pile on to those complaints. Rather, it begins where others have left off. If
major decisions are going to be made by the President, then how might
separation of powers be reflected within the executive branch? The first-best
concept of "legislature v. executive" checks and balances must be updated to
contemplate second-best "executive v. executive" divisions. And this Essay
proposes doing so in perhaps the most controversial area: foreign policy. It is
widely thought that the President's power is at its apogee in this arena. By
explaining the virtues of internal divisions in the realm of foreign policy, this
Essay sparks conversation on whether checks are necessary in other, domestic
realms.
That conversation desperately needs to center on how best to structure the
ever-expanding modern executive branch. From 608,915 employees working in
agencies in 193o, 3 to 2,649,319 individuals in 2004,4 the growth of the executive
has not generated a systematic focus on internal checks. We are all fond of
analyzing checks on judicial activism in the post-Brown, post-Roe era. So too
we think of checks on legislatures, from the filibuster to judicial review. But

1.

THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at

321-22

Qames Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961).

,. E.g., Meet the Press (NBC television broadcast Sept.

14,

2003) (remarks of Vice President

Richard Cheney), transcriptavailableat http://msnbc.msn.com/id/3o8o244/default.htm.

3.

53 U.S.

BuREAu OF FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC COMMERCE, U.S.

DEP'T OF COMMERCE,

STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 168 (1931), available at http://www2.census.

gov/prod2/statcomp/documents/1931-o.pdf.
4.

U.S. OFFICE OF PERS. MGMT., FEDERAL CIVILIAN WORKFORCE STATISTICS: EMPLOYMENT AND

TRENDS AS OF SEPTEMBER 2004, at 6 (2004), available at http://www.opm.gov/feddata/

html/20o4/september/sepo4.pdf.
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there is a paucity of thought regarding checks on the President beyond banal
wishful thinking about congressional and judicial activity. This Essay aims to
fill that gap.
A critical mechanism to promote internal separation of powers is
bureaucracy. Much maligned by both the political left and right, bureaucracy
creates a civil service not beholden to any particular administration and a cadre
of experts with a long-term institutional worldview. These benefits have been
obscured by the now-dominant, caricatured view of agencies as simple antichange agents. This Essay celebrates the potential of bureaucracy and explains
how legal institutions can better tap its powers.
A well-functioning bureaucracy contains agencies with differing missions
and objectives that intentionally overlap to create friction. Just as the standard
separation-of-powers paradigms (legislature v. courts, executive v. courts,
legislature v. executive) overlap to produce friction, so too do their internal
variants. When the State and Defense Departments have to convince each other
of why their view is right, for example, better decision-making results. And
when there is no neutral decision-maker within the government in cases of
disagreement, the system risks breaking down.
In short, the executive is the home of two different sorts of legitimacy:
political (democratic will) and bureaucratic (expertise). A chief aim of this
Essay's proposal is to allow each to function without undermining the other.
This goal can be met without agency competition-overlapping jurisdiction is
simply one catalyzing agent. Other ideas deserve consideration, alongside or
independent of such competition, such as developing career protections for the
civil service modeled more on the Foreign Service.
Executives of all stripes offer the same rationale for forgoing bureaucracyexecutive energy and dispatch.' Yet the Founders assumed that massive
changes to the status quo required legislative enactments, not executive
decrees. As that concept has broken down, the risks of unchecked executive
power have grown to the point where dispatch has become a worn-out excuse
for capricious activity.
Such claims of executive power are not limited to the current
administration, nor are they limited to politicians. Take, for example, Dean
Elena Kagan's rich celebration of presidential administration.6 Kagan, herself a
former political appointee, lauded the President's ability to trump bureaucracy.
Anticipating the claims of the current administration, Kagan argued that the

5.

E.g., THE FEDERALIST No. 70, at 424 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)

6.

Elena Kagan, PresidentialAdministration, 114 HARv. L. REV.

(arguing that the presidency is characterized by "secrecy[] and dispatch").
2245 (2001).
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President's ability to overrule bureaucrats "energize[s] regulatory policy"
because only "the President has the ability to effect comprehensive, coherent
change in administrative policymaking."' Yet it becomes clear that the Kagan
thesis depends crucially on oversight by the coordinate legislative branch
(typically controlled by a party in opposition to the President). Without that
checking function, presidential administration can become an engine of
concentrated power.
This Essay therefore outlines a set of mechanisms that create checks and
balances within the executive branch. The apparatuses are familiar -separate
and overlapping cabinet offices, mandatory review of government action by
different agencies, civil-service protections for agency workers, reporting
requirements to Congress, and an impartial decision-maker to resolve interagency conflicts. But these restraints have been informally laid down and
inconsistently applied, and in the wake of September 11 they have been
decimated. 8 A general framework statute is needed to codify a set of practices.
In many ways, the status quo is the worst of all worlds because it creates the
faqade of external and internal checks when both have withered.
This Essay's proposed reforms reflect a more textured conception of the
presidency than either the unitary executivists or their critics espouse. In
contrast to the unitary executivists, I believe that the simple fact that the
President should be in control of the executive branch does not answer the
question of how institutions should be structured to encourage the most robust
flow of advice to the President. Nor does that fact weigh against modest
internal checks that, while subject to presidential override, could constrain
presidential adventurism on a day-to-day basis. And in contrast to the doubters
of the unitary executive, I believe a unitary executive serves important values,
particularly in times of crisis. Speed and dispatch are often virtues to be
celebrated.
Instead of doing away with the unitary executive, this Essay proposes
designs that force internal checks but permit temporary departures when the
need is great. Of course, the risk of incorporating a presidential override is that
its great formal power will eclipse everything else, leading agency officials to
fear that the President will overrule or fire them. But just as a filibuster does
not tremendously constrain presidential action, modest internal checks, buoyed
by reporting requirements, can create sufficient deterrent costs.

7.
8.

Id. at 2341.
See, e.g., Glenn Kessler, Administration Critics Chafe at State Dept. Shuffle, WASH. POST, Feb.
21, 2006, at A4 (describing career officials at the State Department who claim to be stifled by
political appointees).
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Let me offer a brief word about what this Essay does not attempt. It does
not propose a far-reaching internal checking system on all presidential power,
domestic and foreign. Instead, this Essay takes a case study, the war on terror,
and uses the collapse of external checks and balances to demonstrate the need
for internal ones. In this arena, public accountability is low-not only because
decisions are made in secret, but also because they routinely impact only people
who cannot vote (such as detainees). In addition to these process defects,
decisions in this area often have subtle long-term consequences that short-term
executivists may not fully appreciate. 9
I.

THE NEED FOR INTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS

The treacherous attacks of September 11 gave Congress and the President a
unique opportunity to work together. Within a week, both houses of Congress
passed an Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF);1° two months later
they enacted the USA PATRIOT Act to further expand intelligence and law
enforcement powers. 1 But Congress did no more. It passed no laws
authorizing or regulating detentions for U.S. citizens. It did not affirm or
regulate President Bush's decision to use military commissions to try unlawful
belligerents. 2 It stood silent when President Bush accepted thinly reasoned
to
legal views of the Geneva Conventions. 3 The administration was content
14
rely on vague legislation, and Congress was content to enact little else.
There is much to be said about the violation of separation of powers
engendered by these executive decisions, but for purposes of this Essay, I want

9.

As such, this Essay is the counterpart to Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as Advicegivers, 50 STAN.
L. REv. 1709 (1998). That article developed a view of judges as structurally situated to

1o.

advise short-term politicians in the long run. Well-functioning bureaucracies are an
alternative to reposing that function in judges, particularly in the foreign affairs context in
which judicial competence is comparatively lower.
Pub. L. No. 107-40, i15 Stat. 224 (2001) (codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1541 note (Supp. III 2003)).

11. Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat.

272 (2001).

12.

Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 66 Fed. Reg. 57,833 (Nov. 16, 2001).

13.

Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug.
3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.

14.

Congress's one foray was the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which prohibits torture and
cruel treatment. Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, tit. X, 119 Stat. 2739 (2005) (codified at to
U.S.C.A § 8oi note and 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 20oodd to 200odd-1 (West Supp. 2006)). But that
bill was coupled to court-stripping language that eviscerated its force. See Aziz Huq, Bush
and Congress Unjustly Add BarriersTo Keep DetaineesAway from Courts, LEGAL TIMEs, Jan. 16,

12,

1949, 6 U.S.T.

2006, at 43.
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to concede the executive's claim -that the AUMF gave the President the raw
authority to make these decisions. A democratic deficit still exists; the values of
divided government and popular accountability are not being preserved. Even
if the President did have the power to carry out the above acts, it would surely
have been wiser if Congress had specifically authorized them. Congress's
imprimatur would have ensured that the people's representatives concurred,
would have aided the government's defense of these actions in courts, and
would have signaled to the world a broader American commitment to these
decisions than one man's pen stroke.
Of course, Congress has not passed legislation to denounce these
presidential actions either. And here we come to a subtle change in the legal
landscape with broad ramifications: the demise of the congressional checking
function. The story begins with the collapse of the nondelegation doctrine in
the 1930s, which enabled broad areas of policymaking authority to be given to
the President and to agencies under his control. That collapse, however, was
tempered by the legislative veto; in practical terms, when Congress did not
approve of a particular agency action, it could correct the problem. But after
INS v. Chadha, s which declared the legislative veto unconstitutional, that
checking function, too, disappeared.
In most instances today, the only way for Congress to disapprove of a
presidential decree, even one chock full of rampant lawmaking, is to pass a bill
with a solid enough majority to override a presidential veto. The veto power
thus becomes a tool to entrench presidential decrees, rather than one that
blocks congressional misadventures. And because Congress ex ante appreciates
the supermajority-override rule, its members do not even bother to try to check
the President, knowing that a small cadre of loyalists in either House can block
a bill.16 For example, when some of the Senate's most powerful Republicans
(John McCain, Lindsay Graham, and John Warner) tried to regulate
detentions and trials at Guantinamo Bay, they were told that the President
would veto any attempt to modify the AUMF. 17 The result is that once a court

15. 462 U.S. 919 (1983).

16.

See Terry M. Moe & William G. Howell, The PresidentialPower of UnilateralAction, iS J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 132, 146 (1999).

17.

OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF
ADMINISTRATION POLICY: S. 1042- NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL

YEAR 2006, at 2-3 (2005), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/OMB/legislative/sap/

1o9-1/slo42sap-s.pdf (stating that the AUMF should not be altered and recommending a
veto of a bill to govern the detention and trial of enemy combatants). That bill eventually
failed and was resurrected in a different form when Congress agreed to prohibit certain
forms of torture in exchange for stripping federal jurisdiction over certain claims from
Guantinamo detainees. See Detainee Treatment Act, 119 Stat. 2739.

2320
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interprets a congressional act, such as the AUMF, to give the President broad
powers, Congress often cannot reverse the interpretation, even if Congress
never intended to give the President those powers in the first place. Senator
McCain might persuade every one of the other ninety-nine Senators to vote for
moment without a supermajority in the House of
his bill, but that is of no
8
well.'
as
Representatives
At the same time, the executive branch has gained power from deference
doctrines that induce courts to leave much conduct untouched- particularly in
foreign affairs.1 9 The combination of deference and the veto is especially
insidious-it means that a President can interpret a vague statute to give
himself additional powers, receive deference in that interpretation from courts,
and then lock that decision into place by brandishing the veto. This ratchetand-lock scheme makes it almost impossible to rein in executive power.
All legislative action is therefore dangerous. Any bill, like Senator McCain's
torture bill, can be derailed through compromise. A rational legislator, fearing
this cascading cycle, is likely to do nothing at all.
This expansion of presidential power is reinforced by the party system.
When the political branches are controlled by the same party, loyalty,
discipline, and self-interest generally preclude interbranch checking. That
reluctance is exacerbated by a paucity of weapons that check the President.
Post-Chadha, Congress only has weapons that cause extensive collateral
damage. The fear of that damage becomes yet another reason why Congress is
plagued with inertia. And the filibuster, the last big check in periods of singleparty government, is useless against the host of problems caused by Presidents
who take expansive views of their powers under existing laws (such as the
AUMF). Instead of preserving bicameralism, Chadha has led to its subversion
and "no-cameralism."
A Congress that conducts little oversight provides a veneer of legitimacy to
an adventurist President. The President can appeal to the historic sense of
checks and balances, even if those checks are entirely compromised by modem
political dynamics. With this system in place, it is no surprise that recent calls

is. This point explains why the strong theory of stare decisis, that courts should not disturb
statutory precedents, see, e.g., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 282 (1972), should not apply to
court decisions that interpret legislation to confer greater power on the executive. The
strong theory rests on the notion that Congress can override any judicial mistake about a
statute, so that congressional silence gives the precedent heightened force. But court
decisions that give the President additional powers are different, for they require a bicameral
supermajority to override a court interpretation. Congress can therefore find itself stuck
with an interpretation of a law that it cannot change -because the President and his loyalists
in Congress will block attempts to return to the law's original intent.
ig. E.g., Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981).
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for legislative revitalization have failed. No successful action-forcing
mechanisms have been developed; instead we are still in John Hart Ely's world
of giving a "halftime pep-talk imploring that body to pull up its socks and
reclaim its rightful authority."2 It is time to consider second-best solutions to
bring separation of powers into the executive. Bureaucracy can be reformed
and celebrated (instead of purged and maligned), and neutral conflict-decision
mechanisms can be introduced. Design choices such as these can help bring our
government back in line with the principles envisioned by our Founders."'
II.

TOWARD BETTER BUREAUCRACY

Assaulted by political forces, the modern agency is a stew of presidential
loyalists and relatively powerless career officials. To this political assault comes
an academic one as well, with luminaries such as Elena Kagan celebrating
presidential administration and unitary executivists explaining why such
theories are part of our constitutional design. This vision may work in eras of
divided government, but it fails to control power the rest of the time.
Some academics claim that the unitary executive requires, as a historical
and constitutional matter, presidential freedom to structure a branch as he sees
fit. But the cult of unitariness should be separated from the reality. No one

20.

JOHN HART ELY, WAR AND RESPONSIBILITY: CONSTITUTIONAL LESSONS OF VIETNAM AND ITS
AFTERMATH 52

(1993).

21. This Essay therefore attempts to carry the ideas in HAROLD HONGJu KOH, THE NATIONAL
SECURITY CONSTITUTION: SHARING POWER AFTER THE IRAN-CONTRA AFFAIR (1990), tO

contemporary circumstances, in which Koh's attempts to get Congress and the courts back
into the national-security arena have not been adopted. Unlike most treatments, Koh's book
suggested a handful of procedures that would produce internal checks, largely over covert
operations: (1)inter-agency review of legal opinions authorizing covert action; (2)
designation of the Attorney General as a statutory member of the National Security Council;
(3)release of certain legal opinions to congressional intelligence committees; (4)the
requirement that Presidents make "findings" for all covert action; and (5)the requirement
that the National Security Adviser be a civilian, perhaps even the Vice President. Id. at 16266. Separately, Professor Magill has argued that the notion of separation of powers is
incoherent and that the divided functions of each branch adequately serve as checks. M.
Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separationof Powers Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV.
603, 612-26, 651-54 (2OOl). Magill concluded, for example, that "the amount and character
of that diffusion of state power should be more than sufficient to put to rest concerns about
dangerous concentrations of power." Id. at 654. Time has not been kind to this claim.
Perhaps in 2001, at the time of her writing, divided government produced the coalitions
necessary to prevent a massive increase in executive power. The different era ushered in by
single-party government, however, suggests a great need for changes beyond the current
half-hearted attempt at bureaucracy. That is a key project for those who wish to adapt
principles of divided government to the modem age.

----
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seriously suggests that Congress's division of the military into four separate
services (Army, Navy, Air Force, Marines) is unconstitutional-despite the fact
that the National Security Act of 1947 was passed to stop a President from
eliminating one of the four. 2 Just as free-speech proponents often dodge civic
responsibility for the consequences of particular speech by hiding behind the
Constitution, unitary executivists dodge responsibility for a presidential system
that does not preserve core values of divided government or provide the
President with the best information. By squelching bureaucracy, the President
guarantees that information given to him is not the product of independent
and sober thought but rather data selectively filtered by loyalists.
But hope exists for better bureaucracy, one consistent with the unitary
executive. This Part places the fundamental design question first: What should
an agency system look like to foment internal checks and balances? It then
takes up the question of who should staff the agencies and how individuals
should be induced to exercise their checking function. From there, the Part
considers how agency disagreements should be resolved by both the President
and courts. And finally, it considers how those disagreements should be
publicized outside of the executive to produce external and internal checks.
Before getting into the substance of the proposals, it is worth taking up a
criticism that might be present off the bat. Aren't all proposals for bureaucratic
reform bedeviled by the very forces that promote legislative inertia? If
Congress can't be motivated to regulate any particular aspect of the legal war
on terror, then how can it be expected to regulate anything more far-reaching?
The answer lies in the fact that sometimes broad design choices are easier to
impose by fiat than are specific policies. 3
Any given policy proposal can get mired in a competition of special
interests; indeed, that danger leads many to prefer executive action.
Institutional design changes differ from these specific policy proposals because
they cut across a plethora of interest groups and because the effects on
constituencies are harder to assess due to the multiplicity of changes. The
benefits of faction that Madison discussed in The Federalist No. 51 therefore
arise; multitudes of interest groups find things to embrace in the system
change. It is therefore not surprising that at the same time that Congress
dropped the ball overseeing the legal war on terror it enacted the most
sweeping set of changes to the executive branch in a half-century in the form of

22.

23.

80-253, § 205-207, 61 Stat. 495, 501-03; see J. ROBERT MOSKIN, THE U.S.
MARINE CORPS STORY 434 (3 d ed. 1992) (discussing the fear that without such an act, "the
Corps would be exposed to any future president's wish to reduce or eliminate it").
E.g., James M. Lindsay, Congress, Foreign Policy, and the New Institutionalism,38 INT'L STUD.

Pub. L. No.

Q_281, 282 (1994).
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the Homeland Security Act of 2oo2.4 Indeed, as we shall see, that Act provides
an object lesson: Design matters. And by altering bureaucratic arrangements,
stronger internal checks can emerge.
A. Agency Structure: The Needfor BureaucraticOverlap
Agency design can replicate some functional overlap of responsibilities
among the branches. One of the classic divisions of power in the Constitution
concerns war. Though Congress declares war, the President is the
Commander-in-Chief. s That division is structurally inefficient in the sense
that it creates the possibility of dissension and rivalry. Yet its inefficiency is the
point. 6
Today, academic concern focuses on the extent to which the President and
Congress should control agency decision-making. These discussions center on
the President v. Agency axis. Instead, legal reform could focus on a lower rung:
President v. (Agency, + Agency,). Partially overlapping agency jurisdiction
could create friction on issues before they are teed up to the President for
decision. Otherwise, the President could easily surround himself with people of
a similar worldview who lack expertise.
Redundancy conjures up images of inefficiency and waste. In private
markets, attacks on redundancy became a dominant component of Taylorism
(the early-twentieth-century theory of scientific management) and have
motivated many recent agency consolidations.2 7 But there are a number of
positive redundancies -starting with those in the Constitution itself, which
creates two Houses of Congress and divides functions between two political
branches. Redundancy has practical benefits as well because reliance on just
one agency is risky. It is "a form of administrative brinkmanship. They are
extraordinary gambles. When one bulb blows, everything goes. ,,28
As the common saying goes, "Where you stand is a function of where you
sit." By placing individuals in different organizational structures, different
viewpoints emerge. For example, Colin Powell acts differently as Secretary of

24.

Pub. L. No. 107-296, 116 Stat. 2135.

25.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8; id. art. 1I, § 2.

26. "The doctrine of the separation of powers was adopted by the Convention of 1787, not to
promote efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power." Myers v. United States,
272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
27.

See, e.g., Duplication, Overlap, and Fragmentationin Government Programs:HearingBefore the
S. Comm. on GovernmentalAffairs, 104th Cong. (1995).

28.

Martin Landau, Redundancy, Rationality, and the Problem of Duplication and Overlap, 29 PUB.
ADMIN. REV. 346, 354 (1969) (emphasis omitted).
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State than as head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. 9 Differing perspectives allow
agencies to function more like laboratories, by devising new solutions to new
problems. That is one rationale for the division of antitrust authority between
the Federal Trade Commission and the Department of Justice.3 Moreover, to
the extent that particular agencies are captured by interest groups, overlapping
jurisdiction can mitigate the harm.'
This notion is similar to a free market. We do not want one supplier of
information to the President; a competitive market better supplies clients than
a monopolist. Without bureaucratic overlaps, agencies are not pushed to
develop innovative ways of dealing with problems and may ossify.32 It is
therefore surprising that market-oriented scholars resist conceptualizing the
executive branch in this way. The story of the unitary executive has morphed
into a myth of a President who must have seamless control over the executive
branch. But there is a counter-story to be told, one that emphasizes checks and
balances within the executive branch.
Just as bicameralism and two political branches produce better decisions, so
too there is powerful evidence that Presidents succeed because redundancy
generates the information a President needs.33 Perhaps no analysis so
condemns the status quo as Richard Neustadt's comparison of Franklin D.

z9. A person "does not live for months or years in a particular position in an organization,

30.

exposed to some streams of communication, shielded from others, without the most
profound effects upon what he knows, believes, attends to, hopes, wishes, emphasizes,
fears, and proposes." HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR, at xvi (3d ed. 1976). A
related thought undergirds the aphorisms "two heads are better than one"- that one "head"
situated differently from another will generate different ideas. Systems analysis shows that
individually unreliable units can be combined to produce high reliability. John von
Neumann, Probabilistic Logics and the Synthesis of Reliable Organisms from Unreliable
Components, 34 ANNALS MATHEMATICS STUD. 43 (1956).
William E. Kovacic, DownsizingAntitrust: Is It Time To End Dual FederalEnforcement?, 41
ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 510 (1996).

31.

Cf.Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARv. L. REV.
1667, 1684-87 (1975) (describing the process of agency capture). Organized-crime
investigations are split among state and federal authorities to avoid the effects of bribes and
political influence. Neal Kumar Katyal, Conspiracy Theory, 112 YALE L.J. 1307, 1380 n.266
(2003).

32.

The success of the 1975 Grain Agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union,
for example, can be attributed to overlap between the Departments of State, Agriculture,
and Labor, and the ability of each to influence the President. See Roger B. Porter, The USUSSR Grain Agreement (1998) (Kennedy School of Government Case Program: CR 15-981449.o) (on file with author).

33.

RICHARD

E.

NEUsTADT, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE MODERN PRESIDENTS: THE POLITICS

OF LEADERSHIP FROM ROOSEVELT TO REAGAN 128-33

(rev. ed. 1991).
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Roosevelt and Dwight D. Eisenhower. Roosevelt succeeded because he
guaranteed a flow of information, using his own contacts in agencies:
He would call you in... and he'd ask you to get the story on some
complicated business, and you'd come back after a couple of days of
hard labor and present the juicy morsel you'd uncovered under a stone
somewhere, and then you'd find out he knew all about it, along with
something else you didn't know.'
Roosevelt used bureaucratic overlaps to produce better policy and
information: "His favorite technique was to keep grants of authority
incomplete, jurisdictions uncertain, charters overlapping."3 Eisenhower, by
contrast, imparted "more superficial symmetry and order to his flow of
to
Thereby, he became typically the last man in his '' office
information ....
6
1
choice.
of
acts
with
grips
to
come
to
last
the
and
details
tangible
know
Speed will be necessary, as when responding to disaster or sudden
invasion. But even in these instances, the need for speed should not preclude ex
post examination of executive conduct by agencies sharing jurisdiction. Nor
should it preclude some reporting of that analysis. The constant flow of
information resulting from redundancy may in turn produce better decisionmaking.
Of course, a strong President can stymie two agencies almost as easily as he
can stymie one. 37 For this reason, overlapping jurisdiction (such as that
between the Departments of State and Defense) has failed to mitigate the
excesses of the war on terror. In theory, because each department serves a
different core constituency, the overlap should produce internal checks. But
practice has deviated from theory for three reasons. First, because agencies can
be cut out of relevant decisions by political actors, formal overlap has been
made irrelevant."' Second, even when agencies have been consulted, political

34. Id. at 132 (emphasis omitted).
35.

Id. (quoting

2 ARTHUR
NEW DEAL 528 (1959)).

M.

SCHLESINGER, JR., THE AGE OF ROOSEVELT: THE COMING OF THE

36. Id. at 133.
37.

This was a classic reason for independent agencies. See, e.g., JAMES M. LANDIS, THE
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 113-14 (1938).

38.

For example, the military commission trial "plan was considered so sensitive that senior
White House officials kept its final details hidden from the president's national security
adviser, Condoleezza Rice, and the secretary of state, Colin L. Powell, officials said. It was so
urgent, some of those involved said, that they hardly thought of consulting Congress" and
the longstanding "interagency debate" process was discarded. Tim Golden, After Terror, a
Secret Rewriting of MilitaryLaw, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at Ai.
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influence has compromised the redundant system.39 Third, redundancy's
benefits have collapsed as the legal decision-maker, the Office of Legal
Counsel, has been structurally compromised. These problems illustrate that
overlapping jurisdiction creates only an architecture to enable internal checks.
Without more, that structure collapses under the weight of presidential
influence.
At a minimum, legislation can ensure that relevant agencies have a voice in
significant policy debates within an administration. A State Department
International Law Division or an Army Law-of-War unit means little 4 if°
politicians can exclude such units from the treaty interpretation process .
Congress funds those units to dispense advice to the President and to agencies.
While no legislation can require a President to obey them, a statute could, time
permitting, mandate consultation before action. Therefore, this Essay's first
suggestion is to bolster existing bureaucratic redundancy with legislation
setting out inter-agency consultation requirements. Questions about the
implementation and meaning of our most sacred treaties deserve vetting by the
State and Defense Departments; they are too important to be left to a circle of
loyalists at the White House who do not, and structurally will not, have the
long-term interests of the nation at heart.

39.

In some areas, the Administrative Procedure Act can reduce harm from political control by

requiring agencies to provide some explanation for action, see, e.g., Motor Vehicle Mfrs.
Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 48-49 (1983), and to apply standards
symmetrically from one case to the next, see Pearson v. Shalala, 164 F. 3 d 65o, 660 (D.C. Cir.
1999). But the Act exempts agency action involving "a military or foreign affairs function of
the United States." 5 U.S.C. 5 553(a)(1) (2000); see also id. § 554(a)(4) (2000) (exempting
agency adjudication in the same categories). But see Admin. Conference of the U.S.,
Elimination of the "Military or Foreign Affairs Function" Exemption from APA Rulemaking
Requirements, 1 C.F.R. § 305.73-5 (1975) (recommending the abolition of these "neither

40.

necessary nor desirable" exemptions). The lack of this constraint makes internal checks even
more important.
See, e.g., John Barry et al., The Roots of Torture, NEWSWEEK, May 24, 2004, at 26, 30 ("Cut
out of the [Geneva Convention] process, as usual, was Colin Powell's State Department. So
were military lawyers for the uniformed services. When State Department lawyers first saw
the Yoo memo, 'we were horrified,' said one.").
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B. Agency Composition: Protectionand Promotion of Civil Servants
1. The Foreign Service Model
In France, the top graduates of the nation's premier institutions go into the
civil service.41 America has no comparable pattern. Our top graduates vie for
appointments to supervise agencies, not jobs in the agencies themselves. In
those roles, a distrust of career officials can take root. In turn, many agency
employees come to resent political appointees, become demoralized, and are
42
unable to exercise any significant control over the path of government.
At least one American institution, however, works in a different way: the
Foreign Service. The Service in many respects is "foreign" to American
government; it is our closest analogue to a European model in that it attracts
excellent college graduates and retains them. The Foreign Service is not
perfect; the claim is simply that it functions better than the civil service. Its
vitality is particularly striking given our nation's longstanding distrust of a
diplomatic corps4 3 and because foreign affairs is, for unitary executivists, the
most sacred of executive bailiwicks.
Two factors account for this success. First, the Foreign Service rewards and
protects its employees. Employees are encouraged to rotate through new
positions in new countries so that jobs do not grow stagnant over time.
Second, the Foreign Service rewards merit and discourages spoils. It creates,
for example, extensive opportunities for promotion through its up-or-out
system, whereby management must either be promoted or exit the Service after
a term of years.
Consider one of the most innovative tools in government today, the State
Department's "Dissent Channel." This Channel gives any officer in any
embassy the ability and power to disagree with the position taken by the
ambassador or high-ranking officials. Under State Department regulations, all
dissents are sent to the elite Policy Planning Staff. That office then transmits
them to the Secretary of State, the Deputy, and others who are specifically

See William M. Haraway, III & Dana L. Haraway, American Civil Service Reform: Using
France as a Model To Develop Administrative Statesmen in the Senior Executive Service, INT'L
Soc. Sci. REv., Fall-Winter 2004, at io8, 111-12.
42. Paul C. Light, To Restore and Renew, GOV'T EXECUTIVE, Nov. 1, 2oo, at 32, available at
http://www.govexec.com/features/iio/liolplight.htm.
43. The Continental Congress even required diplomats to return from overseas every three
years, and the "profound suspicion of diplomacy" continued until the 192 4 Rogers Act,
which created the Foreign Service. DONALD WARWICK, A THEORY OF PUBLIC BUREAUCRACY
41.

13 (1975).
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involved in the matter. In most cases, the State Department must acknowledge
receipt of a dissent within two days and prepare a substantive reply within two
months. Dissent messages can be sent anonymously but many times are not
because extensive procedures prevent reprisals. 44
Instead of earning their ire, the Channel has repeatedly earned the praise of
Secretaries of State. It was a Secretary of State, Nixon appointee William
Rogers, who set up the Channel in 1971 because he believed he was not
receiving contrary views. Secretary of State Warren Christopher stated that the
Channel "stimulate[s] new thinking" and is "an established, proven, and
effective instrument for ensuring that those alternative views are heard by
senior policymakers."4 s Indeed, the Channel is so celebrated that an award is
given out every year to the Foreign Service officer who makes the best use of it.
When the last recipient accepted the award, he signaled how the Foreign
Service attitude reflects the internal checking function celebrated in this Essay:
"[W]e signed on for a career that has a larger cause, whoever is the occupant of
the White House. Frankness is a form of dissent. '' , 6 Unlike in other agencies,
dissenters are rewarded in the Foreign Service.4 7
Some fear using the Dissent Channel, but the Channel nevertheless yields
considerable benefits. It is troubling that other agencies lack anything similar
and that this innovative tool has been stuck in the hallways of the State
Department.48 If we want a civil service more like our effective Foreign Service,
replication of the Dissent Channel is necessary-perhaps we should even
permit employees to dissent outside their agency.4 9
Dissent is only one part of the formula for a successful bureaucracy. The
Foreign Service, like every private-sector employer, understands that retention
policies and opportunities for advancement are crucial. If workers fear being
fired unfairly, the most talented individuals either will not join the enterprise
ex ante or will act with excess caution ex post. And if promotions depend on

44.

2 FOREIGN AFFAIRS MANUAL

§ 071.1(C) (1998), available at http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/

abt/18676.htm.

Warren Christopher, Secretary of State, Message on the Dissent Channel (Aug. 8, 1995),
available at http://www.state.gov/s/p/of/abt/1899o.htm.
46. Peter Slevin, Diplomats Honoredfor Dissent, WASH. POST, June 28, 2004, at Al9.
47. "Every one of the 22 mid-level officers who won the Rivkin Award from 1968 to 1992 ...
was subsequently promoted into the Senior Foreign Service. Moreover, fully half of them
have already served as ambassadors, and others can be expected to do so in time." Edward
Peck, Where Wave-Makers Can Prosper,FOREIGN SERVICE J., June 2002, at 32, 34.
45.

48. Id. at 32. ("Nothing similar takes place elsewhere, not in the military, quasi-military, or
purely civilian agencies; just ours, all alone.").
49. See infra Section II.C (suggesting the replacement of the Office of Legal Counsel with a
Director of Adjudication who might receive such dissents).
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catering to the political leadership du jour then it will be similarly difficult to
attract talented employees. Bureaucracies need structures that avoid a
sycophantic race to the bottom whereby workers devote their energies to
pleasing political appointees.
The Foreign Service Act of 198o requires that promotion decisions be made
strictly according to rankings by impartial selection boards."0 These boards
must include at least two outsider evaluators, thereby reducing the possibility
of favoritism. The boards may base their decisions only on written
performance evaluations, and the process is viewed as "one of the Service's
most cherished features.""1 Moreover, the Service uses a "rank-in-person"
system like the military, whereby an officer's rank does not change with the
position she happens to occupy at a given time. The system rewards merit far
more often than the civil service's "rank-in-job" approach, which requires a
qualified employee to find an open position graded at a higher level to
advance. 2 The result is a Foreign Service with skilled employees who are
motivated to do their jobs. 3
Along with these procedures, the Service uses bonuses and perks to bond
employees to the organization and to compensate for hardships. 4 It permits
officers to be detailed outside of the State Department to work for international
organizations, Congress, educational institutions, and even corporations."5 The
upshot is that few Foreign Service officers resign; as a result, they fill senior
policy positions in far greater numbers than those in other executive
departments. s6
The panoply of protections given to the Foreign Service no doubt accounts
for the hostility expressed toward it by many political appointees. As former
Judge Laurence Silberman put it,

2071, 2094-96; see ANDREW L. STEIGMAN, THE
FOREIGN SERVICE OF THE UNITED STATES: FIRST LINE OF DEFENSE 40-42 (1985); see also
David Garnham, Foreign Service Elitism and U.S. Foreign Affairs, 35 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 44

so. Pub. L. No. 96-465, § 60-6O5, 94 Stat.

51.

(1975); Martin B. Hickman & Neil Hollander, Undergraduate Origin as a Factor in Elite
Recruitment and Mobility: The Foreign Service-A Case Study, 19 W. POL. O-.337 (1966).
STEIGMAN, supra note So, at 41.

S2. Id. at 33.
53.

ELMER PLISCHKE,

54.

STEIGMAN,

U.S.

DEPARTMENT OF STATE: A REFERENCE HISTORY

66o

(1999).

supra note 50, at 50.

ss. Id. at 45.
56. Id. at 6. Today, one of the six undersecretaries and six of the fifteen assistant secretaries hail
from the Foreign Service, as do a majority of chiefs of missions. U.S. State Department
Biographies Listed by Title or Country, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/c7647.htm (last
visited Aug.

31,

2006).
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I ended my ambassadorial stint with less than friendly feelings toward
the Foreign Service as a whole .... The practice of having Foreign
Service officers in senior State Department positions goes back a long
way; in the minds of many it has attained the status of an accepted
convention. I believe it is time to reject that convention ... "
While admitting that the "Foreign Service does attract, on the whole, the ablest
men and women who enter government,", 8 Silberman claimed that its
entrenched bureaucracy frustrates the ability of the President to conduct
foreign affairs. However, the flip side is that the entrenched bureaucracy takes
a long-term view. The success of the Foreign Service poses fundamental
challenges to unitary executivists who think that the President should be able
to streamline government to issue commands without challenge. If internal
checks work well in an area as sensitive as diplomacy, they deserve
consideration in other areas as well.
2. The Civil Service
At first glance, civil-service personnel policies appear to resemble those in
the Foreign Service. The Civil Service Reform Act of 1978,' 9 following the long
tradition begun with the 1883 Pendleton Actj was "designed to protect career
employees against improper political influences or personal favoritism... and
to protect individuals who speak out about government wrongdoing from
reprisals." 6' The Act prohibits agencies from taking personnel actions that
undermine an emphasis on merit 62 and creates an independent agency, the
Merit Systems Protection Board, to hear appeals of personnel actions. 6 3
But the 1978 Act does not do nearly enough. For one thing, it ensures only
retention; it does not attempt to enliven positions or make promotions
possible. The best employees are more attuned to securing new and exciting

57.

Laurence H. Silberman, Toward PresidentialControl of the State Department, 57

FOREIGN AFF.

872, 872 (1979).
58.

Id. at 883.

sq. Pub. L. No. 95-454,

92

Stat. iiii.

6o. An Act To Regulate and Improve the Civil Service of the United States, ch.

27, 22

Stat. 403

(1883).

61.

S. REP. No. 95-969, at 18 (1978), as reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2723, 2740; see also Jia
Lynn Yang, An Evolving Civil Service, 35 NAT'L J. 2238, 2238-39 (2003).

62.

5 U.S.C. §§ 2301-2305 (2000).

63.

Id. § 1201-1209; see H. Manley Case, FederalEmployee Job Rights: The PendletonAct of 1883 to
the Civil Service Reform Act of1978, 29 How. L.J. 283, 297 (1986).
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jobs than to keeping their current positions. Moreover, the Act does not protect
the jobs of senior employees, such as those in the Senior Executive Service. It
also fails to create job rotations or to permit the same sort of "detailing"
arrangements that characterize the Foreign Service, and it does little to
encourage a system of experienced professionals who feel that they can
challenge political decision-making. The key problem is that advancement is
often dependent on political actors, who dominate the top layers in most
agencies. Thus, even if employees are protected from being fired, they are not
protected from career stagnation.
At the same time, the number of political actors in agencies has grown.
When the National Security Act of 1947 was written, there were twelve
presidential appointees with Senate confirmation in the Department of
Defense; in May 1999, that number stood at forty-four.6" And those numbers
mask the increase in lower-level appointees, the so-called Schedule C
employees. The Volcker Commission found approximately 3000 presidential
appointees in 1989, compared with "barely 200" during Franklin D.
Roosevelt's tenure.6 s
The growth in presidential appointees "year after year inevitably
discourage[s] talented men and women from remaining in the career service,
or entering in the first place. The ultimate risk is reduced competence among
careerists and political appointees alike." 6 6 The Volcker Commission concluded
that "excessive numbers of political appointees serving relatively brief periods
may undermine the President's ability to govern, insulating the Administration
from needed dispassionate advice and institutional memory." 67 And with
political control of agencies comes a lessened ability to reward dissent.
To create a civil service that resembles our Foreign Service, far more
attention must be paid to making exciting employment opportunities available
without forcing employees to leave the service. Attention could also be given to
developing protections for career advancement with a focus on "rank-in-

64.

CHERYL

Y.

MARCUM

ET AL.,

RAND

CORP., DEPARTMENT

OF

DEFENSE

POLITICAL

APPOINTMENTS: POSITIONS AND PROCESS 1, 5 (200),available at http://www.rand.org/pubs/

monograph reports/MR1253.
65.

NAT'L COMM'N ON THE PUB. SERV., LEADERSHIP FOR AMERICA: REBUILDING THE PUBLIC
SERVICE 17 (1989) [hereinafter VOLCKER COMMISSION EPORT]; see also ROBERT MARANTO,
HERITAGE FOUND., WHY THE PRESIDENT SHOULD IGNORE CALLS To REDUCE THE NUMBER

4 (2001), available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/
GovernmentReform/BG1413.cfm (providing a chart of the growth of appointees).

OF POLITICAL APPOINTEES

66. VOLCKER COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 65, at 18.

67. Id. at 7; see also id. at 18 ("Career bureaucracies need to be leavened with fresh ideas from
outside and need to be responsive to presidential leadership. But they can also be a vast
resource of knowledge and impartial judgment.").

----
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person" systems, "up-or-out" promotion, and other mechanisms borrowed
from the Foreign Service.
Granted, it may be unrealistic to envision civil-service reform given
contemporary hostility to labor protections, but at least existing protections
should not be weakened. Yet that is what happened in the Homeland Security
Act of 2002 (HSA), which weakened civil-service protections for approximately
170,000 federal workers. 68 As the HSA began to take shape, then-Homeland
Security chief Tom Ridge stated that greater powers to suspend civil-service
protections were "profoundly important to achieving [the] goal of securing the
homeland. 69
The congressional and public debate was framed along one axis- national
security versus the labor rights of workers, with Republicans generally taking
the view that national security required exemptions from civil-service
protections and Democrats cloaking themselves in the rights of workers. But
both sides missed a fundamental point: National security can be enhanced, not
diminished, by civil-service protections.
Opponents of the President repeatedly made the defensive case that
national security was not weakened by labor protections. 7' The President's
defenders responded that at the time of its creation, the civil service was
necessary to create a "professional workforce free from cronyism" but
contended that in the twenty-first century the model was outdated due to
terrorism. 71

In the tens of thousands of words spilled on these questions, one Senator,
Joseph Lieberman, offered the affirmative case for civil-service protection:
Today, the top echelons of Departments are subject to political
appointment, as they should be, to allow a President to select the loyal
agency leadership he needs and deserves. But the bulk of public
employees are protected against the whims of changing political
climates. We now understand that effective Departments are made up
of both types of employees, working closely together and depending on

68. 6 U.S.C.A. § 412(c) (West Supp. 2006); see also 148 CONG. REC. S7728, 7729 (daily ed. July
31, 2002) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (expressing concern regarding the weakening of civilservice protections).
69. The Homeland Security Act of 2002: Hearing on H.R. 50o5 Before the H. Select Comm. on
Homeland Security, 107th Cong. 24 (2002) (statement of Tom Ridge, Director, Office of
Homeland Security); see also President George W. Bush, Remarks at Mount Rushmore
National Monument in Keystone, South Dakota, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1417 (Aug. 15, 2002).
70.

E.g., 148 CONG. REC. H57 9 3, 5803 (daily ed. July 26,

71.

148 CONG. REC. S9186, 9195 (daily ed. Sept.

2002)

25, 2002)

(statement of Rep. Reyes).

(statement of Sen. Miller).
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one another. Career civil 72servants who develop expertise, know the ins
and outs of Government.

Senator Lieberman then noted that "[tlhose who would dismantle the civil
service system make it more likely that the Colleen Rowleys"- the FBI agent
who wrote a pre-September ii memo regarding flight students- "of tomorrow
and the Department of Homeland Security would be silenced, not heard."73
4

But no one listened.7

Though the HSA decision is portrayed in terms of protecting national
security, an understanding of internal checks suggests that the opposite may be
the case. Though proponents of the HSA claimed that the Act would protect
national security, they were wrong; in fact, the Act weakened national security.
Because the organization it created, the Department of Homeland Security, can
launch reprisals against employees, it cannot effectively guarantee the flow of
information that challenges entrenched understandings. Were Congress
adequately providing the checking function, the need for agencies to do so
would be lessened. But in the absence of a congressional check, a bureaucratic
one must be developed.
This was the genius of the 1883 Pendleton Act, which established civilservice protections. 7' The Act was designed so that
[p]ersons in the employ of the government will feel that they are
servants of the country and not of a party.... They will come to feel
that success does not lie wholly in their ability to retain the favor of
political leaders76 who may, for services rendered, desire to put or keep
them in office.
We have come far from the Pendleton Act, which was written at a time
when agencies were far weaker than they are today. The growth of the
executive militates for stronger, not weaker, civil-service protections. Yet can

(statement of Sen. Lieberman).

72.

148 CONG. REC. S8726, 8739 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2002)

73.

Id. at 8740.

74.

See generally Joseph Slater, Homeland Security vs. Workers' Rights? What the Federal
Government Should Learn from History and Experience, and Why, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L.

75.

As Pendleton's Senate Report warned, under the preexisting spoils system "official positions
are bought and sold, and the price is political servitude. Because of it honest but mistaken
poverty is induced to forego the comforts and independence which reward honorable toil,
and becomes a suppliant for the official crumbs which fall from the table of some political
master." S. REP. No. 47-576, at iv (1882).

76.

Id. at xi.

295, 311-12 (2004).

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

INTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS

we really say that civil servants today view themselves as "servants of the
country and not of a party"? Or that their "success does not lie wholly in their
ability to retain the favor of political leaders"? While the Foreign Service might
answer both of these questions in the affirmative, few agencies could say the
same thing today.
C. InternalAdjudication
Overlapping bureaucratic mandates and protections for civil servants can
only take matters so far. With friction comes the need for a decision-maker.
Hopefully, the tumble between two agencies will lead to compromise without
external resolution, but this aspiration is not always met. Again, unitary
executive proponents haunt the debate with the claim that the President must
be the final decision-maker. But even a unitary executive needs subordinates to
resolve conflicts that need not occupy his attention. A central goal of executivebranch management is, after all, conservation of the President's time and
energy. The subordinate decision-maker could have a different skill set and
outlook from the President; for example, her neutrality might inspire
confidence, both in the public eye and in the courts, in a way that political
decisions could not.
To take one example, Article 5 of the Third Geneva Convention states:
Should any doubt arise as to whether persons, having committed a
belligerent act and having fallen into the hands of the enemy, belong to
any of the categories enumerated in Article 4,such persons shall enjoy
the protection of the present Convention until such time as their status
has been determined by a competent tribunal.'
And Article 3 provides that "[i]n the case of armed conflict not of an
international character .. each party" must prohibit "outrages upon personal
dignity, in particular, humiliating and degrading treatment" and "affor[d] all
the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispensable by civilized
peoples.78
Administration policies departed from these longstanding rules. The
lawyerly arguments behind these positions were weak,79 but what really
concerns us here is process, not substance. For fifty years, the executive branch

77. Geneva Convention Relative to Treatment of Prisoners of War, supra note 13, art. 5.
78.

Id. art. 3.

79.

See

DEREK JINKS, THE RULES OF WAR: THE GENEVA CONVENTIONS IN THE AGE OF TERROR

(forthcoming 2008).
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has taken the position that POW hearings should be given to all who assert
POW status. Indeed, the Army gave these hearings to members of the Viet
Cong and guerillas.8
How was this weighty issue resolved in the Bush Administration? A deputy
in the Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), John Yoo, wrote a memorandum
claiming that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to particular detainees.8 2
When the State Department found out, its legal adviser, William Taft,
disagreed in strong terms. Eventually, the Secretary of State, Colin Powell,
complained to the White House, and the Attorney General defended Yoo's
position. Yoo's position eventually became the position of the President." 3
A number of failures characterized this process. For one, the meaning and
reach of the Geneva Conventions are, at bottom, legal questions. These
questions involve a close reading of text and history, as well as a consideration
of precedent. Agencies may differ about the rules, and they need somewhere to
go to voice their opinions and seek adjudication. The President is of course one
outlet, but he is exceptionally busy. Moreover, a presidential decision is best
made, time permitting, after a neutral agency decision-maker has examined the
matter first.
The problem with the Yoo memo lay with the supposedly neutral decisionmaker, the OLC. It is perfectly appropriate for agencies within the government,
such as the CIA or Department of Defense, to disagree with a particular
interpretation of the Conventions. One function of agencies is to push the law,
particularly in national-security matters. But when that push is made, there has
to be dispassionate analysis from a neutral decision-maker, instead of a pep
squad masquerading as a quasi-judge.
A crucial function of OLC is to resolve inter-agency legal disputes. 4 In
performing this and other functions, OLC prides itself on its independent

go. Army Reg. i9o-8,

S 1-6

(1997),

available at http://www.usapa.army.mil/pdffiles/

r19o8.pdf.
81.

60 NAVAL WAR COLLEGE, INTERNATIONAL LAw STUDIES: DoCUMENTS ON PRISONERS OF

WAR 722-31 (Howard S. Levie ed., 1979).

82. Draft Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., & Robert J.
Delahunty, Special Counsel, to William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep't of Def. (Jan.
9, 2oo2), availableat http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5o25o4o/site/newsweek.
83. See Golden, supra note 38. Nothing here should be taken as personal criticism of Professor
Yoo. While some of his positions are not easily defensible, they are understandable (even
predictable) given the structural design of the modem executive branch.
84. See Exec. Order No. 12,146, 3 C.F.R. 409, 411 (1979).

2336

Imaged with the Permission of Yale Law Journal

INTERNAL SEPARATION OF POWERS

judgment and expertise.8s When its high-ranking officials become advocates,
however, the system breaks down. The decisions of that Office begin to look
suspect, resembling a courtroom flush with political influence rather than law.
Yet the political pressure on OLC officials is unavoidably immense. They are,
after all, political appointees themselves-the head of the Office and all the
deputies are politically appointed. 86 They are expected not only to adjudicate
disputes but also to advise the President, and they are regularly present at
White House meetings. And in this climate, there is simply no way that OLC's
aspiration to be a neutral decision-maker can play out in practice. Simply put,
they are lawyers with a client to serve.
OLC's practice of issuing written opinions is not an office conceit; it
reflects the underappreciated fact that in resolving inter-agency disputes, OLC
is supposed to function as a court. The client-driven advisory function,
however, infects its adjudicatory role.8" Just as the trend in the government has
been to split the litigation function from the advisory function (so that there is
no longer a Solicitor General who both litigates and advises), a new split
between the advisory and adjudicatory functions of OLC is necessary. 8
Instead of a compromised OLC, OLC should be stripped of its adjudicatory
role and permitted to function only as an adviser to the administration. As
counselors, OLC attorneys would help troubleshoot legislation, research
discrete areas of law, and provide their best judgment as to legal views. The
adjudication function would be transferred to a separate official, a Director of
Adjudication, who would resolve inter-agency disputes. Unlike an Article III
judge, the Director would not hold tenure for life, but rather for periods of four
years that straddle presidential terms, subject only to removal for cause.
At this point, unitary executivists blush. How can such an entity not be
under the direct control of the President? Even if direct presidential control of
the Director is constitutionally compelled (and there are good reasons to think
it is), that would not mean the Director is unconstitutional. It would merely
make the Director's decisions subject to presidential overrule. An overruling

85. Former OLC head Ted Olson stated, "[I]t is not our function to prepare an advocate's brief
or simply to find support for what we or our clients might like the law to be" because OLC
aims to make "the clearest statement of what we believe the law provides and how the courts
would resolve the matter." Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in
Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REv. 676, 727 (2005) (quoting Olson).
86. Id. at 716.

87. Id. at 720 n. 135 (quoting analyses that find that OLC functions in a client-driven capacity).
88. Indeed, ABA rules have in the past issued different standards for advisers than for litigators.
See MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-3 (1986); see also Lon L. Fuller & John D.
Randall, Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint Conference, 44 A.B.A. J. 1159, 1161
(1958) (describing a similar distinction).
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might be appropriate because the Director might make a mistake or might not
be attuned to particular foreign-policy consequences, or because her lack of
political accountability might dispose her toward adventurism.
The downside of incorporating a presidential-overrule mechanism is that it
may politicize the Director. The Director might fear being overruled and tailor
opinions accordingly. But that dark scenario is unlikely to unfold -a rational
Director would appreciate the myriad reasons why a President's formal power
would not be exercised, such as fear of publicity and lack of expertise.8 9 Yet the
formality trap looms far larger in executive power debates than it should. We
do not clamor for legislation to restrict federal courts from issuing advisory
opinions simply because they are the only ones to have announced this
restriction on their jurisdiction. So too we do not clamor for legislation to
prevent Congress from easily declaring war simply because it could. Instead, in
both cases we rely on obvious internal checks. Here, too, publicity, expertise,
and good judgment will make it structurally difficult for the President to
overrule the Director in many instances.
Government has confronted a similar problem before. The Ethics in
Government Act of 1978 created something akin to a Director of Adjudication,
albeit in the form of a prosecutor instead of a judge.9" The Independent
Counsel lacked accountability and was often insensitive to a decision's longterm cost. 91 Congress eventually let these powers return to the Justice
Department. But the Department then issued regulations creating Special
Prosecutors removed from the day-to-day control and influence of political
actors. 92 Special Prosecutors are free to conduct their investigations and, after
deciding on particular courses of action, must present their proposals to the
Attorney General, who retains a veto power.
Critics relied on the formality trap, arguing that internal regulations would
falter under the Attorney General's veto power. In response, the regulations
required the Attorney General to notify Congress if he interfered with a Special
Prosecutor. As a result, lines of accountability were preserved, so much that the

89.

See generally Jennifer S. Lerner &Philip E. Tedock, Accountingfor the Effects ofAccountability,
125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 255, 270 (1999)

(discussing empirical research on accountable decision-

making).
go. Pub. L. No. 95-521, §§

91.

6o-602,

92

Stat. 1824,

1867-74.

See The Future of the Independent Counsel Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Governmental

Affairs, io6th Cong. (1999) (statement ofJanet Reno, Att'y Gen. of the United States).
92. My job at the Department of Justice involved drafting these regulations and the testimony
in the preceding footnote. Nothing in this Essay reflects any private knowledge; the
regulations and their intended goals have long been matters of public record.

-Q.
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Attorney General could be held responsible for trying to bury an investigation.
Thus, the matter would receive political, though perhaps not public, oversight.
Similarly, a presidential overruling of the Director of Adjudication could
trigger reporting to Congress. Congress, though unlikely to begin legislating
after a single override (for reasons offered in Part I), could use formal pressures
of oversight hearings and informal pressures through the media to demand
some accountability. While the executive would therefore be accountable to the
other branches, instead of directly to the public, these mechanisms would
nevertheless function as a valuable constraint. Over time, a culture of
compliance might emerge, in which Presidents would not second-guess the
opinions of the Director except in extreme instances.
The traditional case against OLC independence is that it leads to less advice
rather than more. 93 But there are ways to structure the system to avoid much of
this problem. The trick lies, once again, in taking seriously OLC's function as a
court. Like a court, the OLC has rules that enable aggrieved parties to bring
their disputes to it. Those quasi-"standing" rules could be liberalized to permit
more entities to seek the Director's judgment. Bureaucratic overlap does this by
creating more parties who can "sue." A legal dissent channel for employees, not
only agencies, to refer legal questions could do even more.
Today, OLC often hears only one side of an issue because a single agency
presents an issue to it. As a result, OLC gets a distorted picture, quite unlike a
court. 94 Agency overlap would thus create more traditional legal adversaries.

By splitting adjudication from advice, agencies, as well as the judicial branch,
will develop trust in the new entity. That is the lesson of the ill-fated War
Resources Board, created by President Roosevelt in 1939 to manage war
mobilization. That Board collapsed after a few months and was replaced by a
series of other short-lived boards. The only one to succeed was the Office of
War Mobilization (OWM). "To avoid the weakness of cabinet committees and
commissions, OWM was a decision maker. To avoid the jealousy and rivalry
inspired by the War Production Board, OWM ran no programs, created no
czars, and had a minuscule budget.... OWM was a courtroom, not an agency.

93. Pillard, supra note 85, at 714 ("[B]ecause resorting to OLC is purely optional, any agency
wary of advance constitutional scrutiny of its conduct, or simply unaware of or inattentive to
constitutional implications, may fail to seek advice from OLC.").
94. Id. at 737 ("Opposing views are usually unavailable to OLC because the programmatic
interests of the requesting entities support only one side. Virtually all requests for OLC
advice are privileged and confidential, so there is no opportunity for members of the public,
academics, advocacy groups, or others to supply the otherwise-missing information or
analyses.").
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It worked."9' For similar reasons, the fact that the Director of Adjudication
would not have the President's ear on a daily basis would encourage more
disputes to be brought to it and would avoid the jealousy that plagued the War
Production Board. OLC at present must dance delicately around its two
functions, not only when it works with the President but also when it works
with impacted agencies. 96
The executive has some self-interest in developing an insulated adjudicator
of legal issues. The Bush Administration's chief argument in federal court
against, for example, the applicability of the Geneva Conventions to detainees
at Guantinamo has been that OLC and the President have determined that the
Conventions do not apply. Had a neutral adjudicator prepared a full "lower
court" opinion for final presidential decision, the case for judicial deference to
the President would have been stronger. But the ad hoc process produced selfserving rationales, particularly as it was conducted in secret.
Courts here can jump-start matters by requiring a system of internal checks
before permitting a President to take advantage of the judicial deference
historically afforded to presidential decisions. Yet contemporary law suggests
the reverse. For example, in Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, the Court held that
the Civil Service Commission's rule barring aliens from service in the federal
government was forbidden. 97 But the Justices suggested that if the President
(as opposed to a mere agency) issued the rule, it might be permissible. 98 From
the perspective of this Essay, the Court might have it somewhat backwards agency decision-making might be considerably more evenhanded than

95.

JAMES Q.WILSON,

BUREAUCRACY

270-71

(2d ed. 2000).

96. Professor Pillard's excellent article implies that OLC can be reformed without drastic
measures, such as by "Encourag[ing] Express Presidential Articulation of Commitment to
Constitutional Rights." Pillard, supra note 85, at 745. If one could wave a wand to cause that
kind of presidential action, then Pillard's conclusion would follow. But individual cheeringon in a law review to elect or motivate a certain type of President will have about the same
sway as the pep talks to Congress that John Hart Ely described. See supra text accompanying
note 20.

Pillard's other solutions, such as increasing the number of published OLC opinions and
encouraging employees to act as constitutional whistleblowers, Pillard, supra note 8S, at 749S3, have much to commend them. These ideas will work far better with the reforms
proposed here. For example, Pillard fears that forcing publication of OLC opinions would
lead agencies not to seek their advice. Bureaucratic overlap, and its de facto liberalization of
"standing," can mitigate that problem by forcing conflicts to the adjudication "court."
Constitutional whistleblowers, too, are unlikely to have an impact when OLC is not
independent (and is therefore unlikely to rule for a whistleblower) and when the
whistleblower's agency superiors are themselves politicized.
97.

426 U.S. 88,114-17 (1976).

98. Id. at 103.
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presidential decision-making. At the same time, Presidents have accountability
advantages. A penalty default rule like that sketched out here would capture the
benefits from each decision-maker.
So too Congress might be able to jump-start internal checks through
reporting requirements. Reporting requirements are powerful devices that
have gone without much scholarly analysis, though they appear in many places
today. For example, the President must report to Congress "as soon as
possible" after approval of, and before initiation of, covert action." 9 Such
requirements are anathema to unitary executivists. These critics face an uphill
battle, for their position requires dismantling vast numbers of requirements
throughout the Code.' Some laws even require reporting to the public -most
prominently, the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)."' And still other Acts
require the President to consult with entities before acting. °2
In much the same way as the Solicitor General must notify Congress when
he declines to defend the constitutionality of a statute, the President could be
required to notify Congress when he decides that a particular treaty designed
to regulate warfare does not apply to a specific conflict and to provide Congress
with the basis for that determination. °3 Other requirements could be created -

99. 50 U.S.C.

§ 413b(a) ()

(2000).

woo. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1184(e)(4) (2000) (requiring the President to notify Congress and

provide a report before asking the Attorney General to increase or waive the number of
nonimmigrant workers permitted to enter the United States); 8 U.S.C. § 1721(c)(2) (Supp.
II. 2002) (requiring, as part of the USA PATRIOT Act, the President to consult with
Congress in creating a coordination plan among law enforcement and intelligence agencies);
22 U.S.C. § 2022 (2000) (requiring an annual reporting to Congress on "activities of the
International Atomic Energy Agency and on the participation of the United States therein");
id. § 2364(a)(3) (requiring the President to provide Senate Committees with "written policy
justification" before providing arms, credits, or guarantees to foreign governments); id. §
2429a-2 (requiring the President to notify Congress within fifteen days after providing
assistance to a non-nuclear power that violated an International Atomic Energy Agency
safeguard); id. § 2799aa-l(a)(2)

(requiring notification to Congress if the President

furnishes aid to a country that would otherwise be ineligible under nuclear nonproliferation controls); id. § 6442(b)( 3 ) (requiring notification if the President determines a
country is violating religious freedom severely).
101. 5 U.S.C.

§

55 2(f)

(2000) (identifying the Executive Office of the President as subject to

FOIA).
E.g., 19 U.S.C. § 2155(a) (2000) (requiring the President to "seek information and advice
from representative elements of the private sector" and take that advice under consideration
when negotiating trade agreements).
103. You might ask whether this requirement is necessary, since the Geneva Convention
determinations made by President Bush are now common knowledge. But the President
made his determinations on February 7, 2002, and their basis was not publicly revealed for
two years (and only then via leak). Richard A. Serrano & Richard B. Schmitt, Files Show
102.
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for example, notifying Congress of the number of individuals held in military
detention, the conditions of their confinement, the allegations (if any) against
them, and their nationalities.
Such reporting requirements would not only create an information flow to
Congress that would promote external checks but would also eliminate a
perverse effect engendered by strengthening the bureaucracy. The more power
a bureaucrat has, the greater the President's temptation to staff the position
with a loyalist. Reporting requirements can help mitigate this problem by
guaranteeing that Congress will learn of the decisions that bureaucrats make
and the reasons they gave for making those decisions. Of course, in a one-party
government, Congress might not act even with an abundance of material. But
reporting requirements, given the two-year election cycle, would have some
effect.
That effect might be strengthened by coupling this reform to others, such
as minority hearings. Currently, only the majority party in Congress can hold
oversight hearings. There is no obvious reason for this winner-take-all system.
Imagine, instead, that during periods of single-party government, in which
both Houses of Congress and the presidency are controlled by the same
political party, the dominant minority party could hold oversight hearings in
the Senate. 1 4 Because the hearings would only create a voice, not a dominant
vote, they would not give the minority a weapon to block government actions.
Permitting the minority party to hold hearings might produce modest
constraints on domineering executives and could work in synergy with
reporting requirements and bureaucratic job protections to ensure better
information flow. Oddly, there appears to be no academic discussion of the
possibility or advantages of minority hearings in our law reviews. Such
hearings might lead to policy stagnation under the eye of greater
accountability, or perhaps the hearings will ultimately prove ineffectual. These
results are not self-evident, however, and future examination is appropriate.

Bush Team Torn over POWRules, L.A. TimEs, June 23, 2004, at Ai. Such leaked decisions can
104.

be presented as fait accompli, so that reversing policy would be interpreted as weakness.
To further entice support for the idea, legislation could be passed now, to take effect in
2009.
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III. OBJECTIONS AND REFINEMENTS

A. Kagan's PresidentialAdministration
Elena Kagan's recent defense of presidential administration concentrated
on domestic policy, but her ideas suggest a criticism of the above proposals.
She claims that presidential administration energizes a moribund bureaucracy:
The need for an injection of energy and leadership [by the President]
becomes apparent, lest an inert bureaucracy encased in an inert political
system grind inflexibly, in the face of new opportunities and challenges,
This
toward (at best) irrelevance or (at worst) real harm..
conclusion, of course, would be less sound to the extent that the
political and administrative systems fail to impose adequate limits on
the President's exercise of administrative power. Then, the balance
between friction and energy would tip toward the opposite extreme away from the too broad curtailment of regulatory initiative to the too
facile assertion of unilateral power. One reason not to fear this outcome
relates to the President's accountability to the public ....
But this view of the presidency, at least in the realm of foreign affairs, is as
far from a description of contemporary reality as are Madison's views,
reprinted in the first paragraph of this Essay. Consider such claims in light of
the facts that: (1) there is little public accountability when decisions are secret;
(2) agency officials have been excluded from providing input on answers to key
legal questions; (3) no neutral subordinate decision-maker exists; and (4) the
administration has itself asserted that the brunt of these questions are beyond
the purview of the courts altogether.
A number of other assumptions are built into Kagan's claim. Kagan was
self-consciously writing in an era of divided government,"°6 and she was

extolling presidential transparency as well. After all, a chief advantage of
presidential administration is its accountability. But that claim has little
applicability to foreign affairs, in which presidential interventions are often
classified or hidden and in which agency conflicts are often swept under the

105. Kagan, supra note 6, at 2344-45. Kagan states that her discussion of the Clinton presidency

(which she later calls the "centerpiece" of her article) is about its attempt to use the
President's authority to achieve domestic policy goals. Id. at 2248; see also id. at 2282, 2307,
2345. Also, at a few points, she excludes or distinguishes foreign policy. See id. at 2291, 2313
n.267, 2364 n.444, 2371. As such, the above analysis is not a direct criticism of her article but
rather of attempts to extend her concept to foreign affairs.
106. See id. at 2312.
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rug. Accountability can never be a powerful solution in foreign affairs, just as
accountability cannot adequately constrain the criminal prosecution power
under the Article II Take Care Clause. Instead, a second-best substitute is
needed. In the prosecution context, that accountability substitute is a Special
Prosecutor and a reporting requirement. 1 7 In this context, it might take the
form of overlapping agency jurisdiction and reporting or consultation
requirements.
Given where Kagan once sat, in the White House's Domestic Policy
Council, it is not surprising that she lingered over claims that "bureaucracy also
has inherent vices (even pathologies), foremost among which are inertia and
torpor. " "1sWith vivid portraits of necrosis -"agencies inevitably develop
'arteriosclerosis"' 10 9 and "ossification syndrome""' -Kagan paints a picture of
agencies resting on their laurels and remaining adverse to change. This is, of
course, a common feeling for any high-level political appointee in any
administration, as Kagan herself recognizes."' And while this view is
understandable, it invites the question of whether the vantage-point of an
administration that wants to get things done is the proper one for setting
parameters in constitutional and administrative law. There are sometimes good
reasons for employing tradition-bound actors, reasons no doubt
underappreciated by political appointees but perhaps wise nonetheless.
Kagan's defense of presidential administration centers largely on the energy
a President gives regulatory agencies. But there are values other than efficiency,
values celebrated by our Founders. Indeed, a starting point for our government
is the evil of government efficiency." 2 Pointing to statements from Hamilton
about the dangers of a "feeble executive" and the like, Kagan claims that the
"countertradition" of strong, executive vigor outweighs these concerns." 3 But
that countertradition presumes an active Congress as an overseer of
presidential decision-making. When Hamilton feared a feeble executive, he did

107. See supra text accompanying notes 92, 99-102.
lo8. Kagan, supra note 6, at 2263.
log. Id. at 2264 (quoting Louis L. Jaffe, The Effective Limits of the Administrative Process: A

Reevaluation, 67 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1109 (1954)).

iio. Id. (quoting ANTHONY DowNs, INSIDE BuREFucACY 158 (1967)).
ill.

Id. at 2272 & n.96.

112.

Kagan recognizes this, mentioning in a paragraph the Founders' concerns about checks and
balances. Id. at 2342.

113.

Id. at 2342-43 (citation omitted). There are many other ways to deal with ossification besides
presidential administration, such as constant infusion of new people, rotational service
arrangements modeled on the Foreign Service, opportunities for promotion, overlapping
agency jurisdiction to stimulate competition, and so on.

234.4
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not imagine an executive who had "only" 2.6 million employees and fifteen
cabinet secretaries, 1 4 or a President who could commit hundreds of thousands
of troops to the field without a declaration of war and who had the military
might to decimate entire continents by pushing some buttons, or a President
who claimed he had the ability to set aside treaties ratified by a supermajority
of the Senate.
Kagan concedes that agencies do have some expertise that will prove
relevant. 15 But the advantage of empowering bureaucrats is not limited to their
expertise; it also has to do with their time horizons. Presidents suffer from a
last-period problem-a problem seen, for example, in President Clinton's lastminute pardons. A chief advantage of bureaucracy is to maintain the long-term
view. By articulating the prospective costs, an effective bureaucrat is able to
refocus government questions away from the crisis du jour.
So, for example, even if a creative reinterpretation of the Geneva
Conventions might be in the interest of a President who will soon leave office,
it might not be in the long-term interest of the military or the country. The
impact on international humanitarian law, and the safety of our own troops,
will not manifest itself immediately. Just as Presidents face incentives to
deficit-spend, they also face incentives to maximize well-being in the short
term at the expense of the longer term. In our system of government, only
courts and bureaucrats have longer time horizons. Judges, as generalists with
limited jurisdiction, are not situated to protect all of the nation's long-term
interests. Bureaucrats must fulfill that role.
In the end, Kagan is surely right to point out that a President has a "stake"
in building an efficient government," 6 but efficiency is not the equivalent of
wisdom. Wisdom requires tradition-bound professionalism and the realization
that future generations will feel the effects of earlier politicians' decisions.
B. Ackerman's PoliticalEntrenchment
Others might come at the problem from the other side, claiming that
effective bureaucracy is impossible in America. Bruce Ackerman recently
argued, for example, that the checking function of bureaucracy is elusive in a
tripartite system of government. His claim is that when American politicians
intervene in bureaucratic affairs, they invariably muck them up. Lofty rules of

114. See supra text accompanying note 4.
11s. Kagan, supra note 6, at 2352-53.
116. Id. at 2355 (citing Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure,
LAw&CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 1994, at j, 11).
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general applicability become contorted to fit a particular politician's views." 7
And the upshot is to encourage Presidents to staff agencies with loyalists who
use the mantra of "central coordination" to control agencies as much as
possible.11
Ackerman is surely right to say, given the competing political pulls of
Congress and the executive, that American bureaucracy cannot function in the
European fashion. But there is no reason to think that a modest checking
function, akin to the modest check envisioned by the separation of the
branches, cannot emerge. After all, such constraints arise in Europe despite the
obvious knowledge that whatever position a bureaucrat takes can eventually
invite ridicule or praise when a new government comes into power. To be sure,
a Prime Minister need not pressure a bureaucracy as often, since he can
accomplish his aims via legislation without administrative lawmaking. But
limited political capital constrains such action and similarly constrains his
ability to overrule bureaucratic decisions.
In both systems, bureaucracies can perform a checking function.
Overlapping jurisdiction, civil-service protections and promotion, and the
invigoration of the agency bureaucrat as an elite force will produce modest
internal checks. This is the lesson from the Foreign Service, which has
developed into a well-functioning entity despite being housed in a threebranch government. At the same time, one must be careful not to oversell these
reforms. The President will play a more powerful role than his European
counterparts by being able to trump bureaucratic decision-making. That
approach suffuses the bureaucracy's expertise-laden legitimacy with political
legitimacy, while simultaneously valuing quick presidential action and control
in times of crisis. The modest internal checking function created by
bureaucratic overlap and civil-service protections, coupled with reporting
requirements, moves the balance away from the regime of nearly pure
presidential control toward a middle ground that more closely approximates
the separation of powers laced into the fabric of our constitutional order.
C. The Divided Government Problem
Perhaps the most intractable problem is to engineer a system that controls
the excesses of one-party government without creating so many obstacles that

117. Bruce Ackerman, The New Separationof Powers, 113 HARv. L. REv. 633, 689 (2000).

118. Id. at 700-03.
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it falls apart during two-party rule. Gridlock, for example, is more common in
divided government, 9 and internal checks can exacerbate it.
For these reasons, many of the solutions advocated here are modest checks
and balances that permit presidential overruling of bureaucratic decisions.
They do not envision an insurmountable minority veto. Instead, they recognize
that the current expansion of presidential power requires internal processes
that ensure better decision-making. During periods of one-party government,
the minority party holds only a single potent weapon, the filibuster. The
filibuster, however, only constrains congressional action, not presidential
rulemaking. A President who broadly interprets legislation that has already
passed (like the AUMF) is not subject to even the filibuster constraint. For that
reason, long-term changes such as civil-service protections are necessary, even
if they have the undesirable byproduct of frustrating presidential
administration.
An alternative to long-term changes is to activate checking mechanisms
only during periods of one-party government. This Essay suggested one such
mechanism, minority-party oversight hearings, to be triggered only during
such periods. This trigger idea could be expanded elsewhere. For example, the
minority party in Congress could be permitted to appoint two ombudsmen to
each agency during periods of one-party government. Those ombudsmen
would serve as clearinghouses for agency whistleblowers and would report
their findings to both houses of Congress and, in appropriate cases, to the
public.
This model, which builds on and supplements the current system of
inspectors general, would be another way to utilize existing structures to
produce more vibrant internal checks. Over fifty inspectors general serve today,
and they are structurally insulated from control by agency heads and required
to report their findings biannually to Congress. 2 ° While these officers no
doubt exercise a check on abuse 2' (and are insulated from political control in
precisely the way that unitary executive proponents fear'), they currently
focus on mismanagement and fraud, not on the development of sound policy.

i19. Kagan, supra note 6, at 2344.
12o.

Inspector General Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-452, 92 Stat. 11Ol; Inspector General
Directory, http://www.ignet.gov/igs/homepagel.htm (last visited Aug. 29, 2oo6). See
generally PAUL C. LIGHT, MONITORING GOVERNMENT: INSPECTORS GENERAL AND THE
SEARCH FoRAcCOUNTABILITY (1993).

121.

See Margaret J. Gates & Marjorie Fine Knowles, The Inspector General Act in the Federal
Government: A New Approach to Accountability, 36 ALA. L. REV. 473, 473-78 (1985).

122.

See Christopher S. Yoo, Steven G. Calabresi & Anthony J. Colangelo, The Unitaty Executive
in the Modern Era, 1945-2004, 90 IOWA L. REv. 6Ol, 68o-81 (2005).
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Such scandal jurisdiction eclipses the far more important matters involving the
merits of particular issues. 23 An ombudsman model could address this
problem, dedicating officers to the types of weighty issues that currently
occupy the State Department Dissent Channel.
CONCLUSION

America faces a choice. It can either take its chances with an extremely
powerful executive branch and the attendant risks that the courts will
underreact and overreact, or it can harken back to a tradition of divided
government that has served our country well. September 11 did change
everything, but it is up to us to figure out how to translate the ideas of divided
government into a modern age in which Presidents must act quickly to avoid
calamity.
Courts, of course, are not unaware that a trend toward greater executive
power in this time of crisis exists. As a result, one can expect that as the
executive becomes more monolithic, courts will function as a sort of check. But
judicial checking is bound to fail. It will often occur too late, if at all. Courts
lack expertise in many areas, and they may intervene when they should not and
refrain from intervening when they should. For this reason, and others
advanced in this Essay, a set of institutional design choices must be made that
permits both sources of executive legitimacy -democratic will and expertise to function simultaneously.
It might be tempting to take the ideas advanced here and implement them
in the domestic sphere, reasoning that foreign affairs is the most difficult area
in which to curb presidential powers. However, the foreign affairs arena is also
replete with civil-liberties concerns that are not properly addressed in the
political process. Moreover, because state governments often exercise a
checking function in the domestic sphere,1 4 there may be less need for internal
checks. Finally, because many foreign-policy decisions are made in secret,
political accountability will not be as much of a constraint as in the domestic
context. Political accountability is a central tenet of the unitary executive, but it
utterly fails to justify expansive presidential powers deployed in secret and
under legal opinions designed to remain secret.
The pendulum today has begun to swing so far toward executive branch
vigor that one must fear that the principles of divided government embraced
by our Founders are no longer working. By giving force to traditions that are

123.

See Mary De Rosa, Privacy in the Age of Terror, WASH. Q:, Summer 2003, at 27, 35.

124.

See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note i, at 323.
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already part of our subtle constitutional landscape - bureaucratic overlap, civilservice protections, internal adjudication, and reporting requirements - some
of this movement can be pulled back toward equilibrium.
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